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on page 23: “The Danielic apocalypses of  chs. 8-12 and the final form of  ch. 
7 respond from the midst of  one of  the most traumatic events in Jewish 
history, the violent persecutions of  Jews by Antiochus IV and the beginning 
of  the revolt against Antiochus by Judah the Maccabee” (23). 
Finally in regard to the challenging texts from Daniel 11, the conclusion 
reached in this commentary is that they “purport to be prophecies but are 
clearly written after the occurrence of  most of  the events they prophesy. But 
they use an account of  history to attempt to make real predictions” (336). 
When reading this statement one cannot help but wonder if  this approach to 
Daniel can still be of  any use to the reader of  today. While this commentary 
offers some useful material for the study of  Daniel (as mentioned above), it 
also serves as an example of  how not to approach Daniel—with speculative 
views that are not in line with the claims found in the sacred texts.
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Alvin Plantinga has taught philosophy for over fifty years, first at Wayne 
State University, then at Calvin College, and finally at Notre Dame. He holds 
honorary degrees from different universities in Europe and the United States, 
and he is widely regarded as the most influential Christian Philosopher alive. 
His works include Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism; 
Warranted Christian Belief; The Analytic Theist; and God, Freedom, and Evil. 
Knowledge and Christian Belief is intended as a shorter and more user-
friendly version of  Warranted Christian Belief but it is also distinguished from 
it by different emphases. The main thesis of  the book revolves around the 
development and defense of  a model, called the Aquinas/Calvin Model 
(or A/C Model). According to this model, the divinely inspired Scripture 
and the internal instigation of  the Spirit produce faith in human beings 
(63). This includes belief  in the great truths of  Christianity. Faith then is 
here not contrasted with knowledge, but it is identified as a special kind of  
knowledge. Platinga defines knowledge as a belief  produced by properly 
working cognitive faculties in the right environment that are designed to 
successfully aim at truth (26–28). The agency of  the Spirit is thus likened to 
other knowledge-producing faculties, such as memory or sensory perception. 
The only difference is that the faith-producing faculties are provided by the 
Holy Spirit and are not naturally found in humans (63). 
Knowledge and Christian Belief starts out by describing a number of  positions 
set forth by different influential philosophers that have the potential to defeat 
Christian faith. In Chapter 1 “Can We Speak and Think About God?,” 
Plantinga deals with Immanuel Kant and his followers, who claimed that 
we cannot say anything about God because we are incapable of  thinking in 
the categories of  ultimate reality. If  God exists, he is among those “things 
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in themselves” that we can neither experience nor comprehend. Plantinga 
identifies this line of  thought as self-defeating, because if  it were true, we 
could not think about God in order to come to the conclusion that we are not 
able to think about him. Furthermore, he points out that Kant’s theory fails 
to account for a priori knowledge, for example in the realm of  mathematics. 
Chapter 2 “What is the Question?” confronts the allegation that Christian 
belief  is in some way irrational, and childish, and somehow connected to 
cognitive malfunction. The crucial point here is a distinction between de 
facto and de jure objections. De facto objections against the Christian faith are 
such that aim at proving the factual beliefs of  Christianity to be wrong or 
incoherent. De jure objections, on the other hand, would claim that it is not 
justified to hold Christian beliefs because it is in some way either unethical 
or irrational. Plantinga keeps to de jure objections in this chapter (his main 
antagonists are Freud and Marx) and addresses them in different ways. The 
main point here is that belief  is not something that is subject to our voluntary 
control and is therefore ethically neutral. An objection to this based on an 
alleged responsibility to believe only that for which we have abundant evidence 
remains unconvincing. Plantinga recognizes however that this does not give 
Christian belief  any warrant and therefore defines the terms “knowledge” 
and “warrant” in preparation for further chapters. 
In chapters 3–6, Plantinga develops his A/C Model, leaning on texts 
from Scripture, Calvin and, Aquinas. His main point here is that Christian 
faith is basic belief. It is not derived from argument, but is delivered to man 
via his sensus divinitatis. This is not to say that the sensus divinitatis does not use 
natural phenomena to awaken faith in God, but the vastness of  the sky or 
the beauty of  nature, which often are quoted in experiences of  faith, are not 
very strong as arguments. Thus, an inbuilt cognitive faculty that may be called 
sensus divinitatis best explains the fact that many people begin to believe while 
witnessing these phenomena. Such a faculty is only to be expected, however, 
if  the Christian faith is also factually true. In short, if  it is true, it likely has 
warrant. If  it is not true, it does not. Mere epistemological considerations, as 
Platinga correctly recognizes, will not solve this issue. The de jure question is 
therefore dependent on the de facto question. The extended A/C model that 
is developed in chapters 5 and 6 claims that the belief  infused into humans 
by means of  the sensus divinitatis is not just about the existence of  God, but 
also about basic Christian teachings about God’s character, the nature of  sin, 
and personal salvation. Also of  special interest is chapter 6, “Sealed upon Our 
Hearts,” in which Platinga challenges the Greek idea of  the impassibility of  
God.
Chapters 7–10 address different objections and defeaters to the A/C 
model. The main objection comes from J. L. Mackie, who claimed that 
Christian belief  can get and needs to get warrant from experience, and that 
this experience must be of  such a nature that it implies the truth of  Christian 
belief. Based on the A/C model, Platinga rejects this claim, because the sensus 
divinitatis, like normal sensory perception, is a direct way to gain knowledge 
and does not need any form of  external evidence. He admits however that 
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there may be experiences that exclude the possibility of  Christian belief  being 
true. Some such phenomena, called defeaters, are addressed in the last few 
chapters. 
Knowledge and Christian Belief presents its reader with a fulminant and very 
convincing philosophical defense of  Christian belief  in the face of  its modern 
and postmodern opponents. This book is not only thought provoking and 
informative, but also relaxing to a certain degree. Platinga confidently and 
calmly puts citations by Richard Dawkins next to Scripture and shows the 
philosophical shallowness of  the young angry atheists and some of  their 
predecessors. Platinga does not need to raise his voice and he does not take 
refuge in spurious arguments taken from fields in which he has no expertise. 
There is one issue however, that makes his main thesis, the Aquinas/
Calvin model, somewhat difficult for the non-Calvinist portion of  Christianity. 
Platinga claims that belief  is not subject to our voluntary decision and can 
therefore not be subject to moral categories (16–17). Thus, we believe what 
we believe and there is nothing we can do about it. This fits perfectly of  
course with his emphasis on the sensus divinitatis and the working of  the Holy 
Spirit that cause faith in us. In good Calvinist tradition, this causation of  faith 
is sufficient to make us believe and is not dependent on any decision of  ours. 
If  this is the case, there is no real reason to search for external arguments to 
convince others of  my beliefs. Platinga does not spell it out, but by implication 
(and by association with the Calvinist tradition) the reader is led to assume 
that the sensus divinitatis is not a universal phenomenon but is found only in 
that portion of  the populace that accepts the basic teachings of  Christianity. 
Nevertheless, even though man is not capable of  rejecting or choosing God, 
but is chosen passively, blame is put on those who do not believe. 
The idea that beliefs are formed involuntarily is central to the A/C 
model, and thus, the model will not easily pass in Arminian circles. However, 
the concept of  a sensus divinitatis as a cognitive function that produces faith 
in God is not foreign to Arminians, even though we would insist that it is 
possible to shake it off. In addition, the subsequent argument that our beliefs 
may have warrant after all remains in place and may prove useful. Other 
arguments are not mentioned in this review, but are nevertheless deserving of  
careful consideration.
Therefore, Knowledge and Christian Belief is a good read, especially for those 
who identify as Calvinist, but also for everyone else. It is creative, thought 
provoking, and not too difficult to read. 
Berrien Springs, Michigan          valentin ZywietZ
Seevers, Boyd. Warfare in the Old Testament: The Organization, Weapons, and Tactics 
of  Ancient Near Eastern Armies. Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Academic, 
2013. 328 pp. Hardcover, $34.99.
The need for a comprehensive, up-to-date volume in English covering warfare 
in the context of  ancient Israel has been felt for some time. Yet recently 
published works on this topic have generally confined their treatment to 
